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N THE last decade important changes have taken place in the complexion of public law. In addition to fundamental modifications in the
approach of courts to questions of constitutional law, an important
development has been the constantly increasing significance of the field of
administrative law. While until several years ago the emphasis had been
on constitutional law, it has now shifted to problems of administrative
law. Constitutional law, with the broadened interpretation of the interstate commerce clause and with the Supreme Court's greater restraint in
invalidating statutes under the due process provisions, became somewhat
stabilized. Administrative law, on the other hand, has become a muchdebated subject presenting novel questions. This increasing significance
of administrative law is reflected in the greater number of Supreme Court
decisions in the field, handed down within recent years, and is observable
in every branch of governmental activity and regulation. It is apparent
in the field of railroad retirement benefits with which the present article
will be specifically concerned.
Establishment of a system of governmental retirement and disability
benefits for employees in the railroad industry was the forerunner in this
country of a general federal social security program. In the earlier stages
questions of constitutionality were the principal legal issues presented by
the railroad retirement legislation. The Supreme Court decision in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.,' a five-to-four decision declaring unconstitutional the Railroad Retirement Act of June 27, 1934, as
against due process and as not falling within the scope of the interstate
commerce clause, was one of the major defeats inflicted upon New Deal
legislation by the Supreme Court in its role as reviewer of the constitutionality of federal legislation. Thereafter, constitutional law only rarely
constituted an issue in the court decisions in the field of railroad retire* Although the writer is employed as an attorney by the Railroad Retirement Board, the
views expressed herein are entirely those of the writer personally, and nothing herein contained
is to be construed as the official opinion of the Railroad Retirement Board. The writer wishes
to express his sincere gratitude to the members of the board's legal staff, especially to Mr. Paul
M. Johnson, Principal Attorney, for many valuable suggestions, but the responsibility for all
statements made of course rests solely with the writer.
f Attorney, United States Railroad Retirement Board.
295 U.S. 330 (1935).
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ment legislation. True, a decision of the district court for the District of
Columbia 3 held invalid the Carriers Taxing Act of 1935,4 which had been
enacted, together with the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935," in an attempt to overcome the effect of the invalidation of the legislation of 1934,
the Carriers Taxing Act providing for the collection of the tax and the
Railroad Retirement Act providing for the payment of benefits;the Court,
also, declared that the two acts constituted inseparable parts of one legislative scheme. This decision, however, was not carried further; instead,
representatives of the railroads and representatives of railroad labor organizations together drafted a new bill. The compromise bill finally became the Railroad Retirement Act of 19376 which, though not repealing,
amended and largely superseded the 1935 act.
Constitutional issues were not passed upon in any of the subsequent
court opinions dealing with cases arising under the Railroad Retirement
Acts. In a suit, under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, to enjoin
the members of the Railroad Retirement Board from enforcing the provisions of the Railroad Retirement Acts of 1935 and i937 (together with a
suit to enjoin the enforcement of the Carriers Taxing Act of 19377 with
which the Retirement Acts were alleged to form a single legislative
scheme), the State of California claimed the unconstitutionality of both
the 1935 and the 1937 acts, if they were applied to the State Belt Railroad
owned and operated by the State of California. However, the Supreme
Court 8 dismissed the bill for lack of equity, without considering the question of constitutionality.
The constitutionality of railroad retirement legislation was considered
in only one court decision since 1936, namely in the opinion of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Californiav. Anglin 9 which was
3 Alton

R. Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board, z6 F. Supp. 955 (1936).

449 Stat. 974, 45 U.S.C. § 241-253; repealed by § ii
So Stat. 440, 45 U.S.C. § 271.

s 49 Stat. 967, 45 U.S.C. § 215-228.
75o

of the Carriers Taxing Act of 1937,

6 5o Stat. 307, 45 U.S.C. § 228a-228s.

Stat. 435, 45 U.S.C. § 261-273 (now ch. 9,subch. B, of the Internal Revenue Code).

8 California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 255 (1938).
9129 F. 2d 455 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 669 (1942). That the case of Railroad Retirement:Board v. Alton R. Co., supra, note i, is no longer considered controlling by the present
Supreme Court is apparent from a statement by the Supreme Court in the case of Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. iii, at 122, note 21 (1942), in which Mr. Justice Jackson listed the Alton
case, together with certain other cases (one of which has since been expressly overruled and
another expressly limited), as instances in which the commerce clause was interpreted restrictively during a certain period in the Court's history; Mr. Justice Jackson then continued in his
opinion as follows:
"Even while important opinions in this line of restrictive authority were being written, how-
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a case arising under the Carriers Taxing Act of 1937. In that opinion,
which is indicative of the changed approach of courts in dealing with the
interstate commerce clause, the Circuit Court of Appeals, proclaiming
that it was not overruling the Supreme Court decision in the A itan case and
not violating stare decisis, invoked the principle of constitutional law that
the facts determining the constitutionality of an act may vary from time
to time, and stated:
Congress certainly could have a rational concept of the effect of a legislatively enforced railroad pension different in 1937 from that in 1934.
Taking judicial notice of the fact that a pension not dependent upon
employer largess has a stronger appeal to the loyalty of railroad employees than a pension dependent upon such largess, the circuit court declared that the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 is constitutional as effectually aiding interstate commerce.
While the practical significance of constitutional law problems thus has
decreased in the field of railroad retirement legislation, weighty issues of
administrative law have arisen. Controlling importance of the statutory
material has always been characteristic of the field of administrative law,
and because of the differences between individual statutory enactments
administrative law has therefore largely defied generalizations. Attempts
have, of course, been made to provide some uniformity. The ill-fated
Walter-Logan Bill, the bill proposed as a fruit of the studies of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,10 and the
"Administrative Procedure Bill" adopted on February 28, '944 by the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association and introduced in
Congress on June 21, 1944!" are outstanding examples of suggestions for
legislation designed to provide some uniformity. Evolution of general
principles of administrative law has occasionally been attempted by the
courts. The Railroad Retirement Act, to a degree exceeding most other
federal statutes, has provided the courts with an opportunity to enunciate
general principles with respect to basic questions of administrative law,
for the reason that this act, unlike many other Federal statutes, lacks express language on certain fundamental issues of administrative law.
ever, other cases called forth broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause destined to supersede the earlier ones, and to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief
Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden ..... " (Italics supplied.)
10Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 192

(1941).
" 78th Cong., 2d Sess., S. 2030 and H.R. 5o81.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS

Traditional doctrine considers the problem of judicial review of administrative adjudications as the basic issue of administrative law, although actually with respect to the great majority of administrative adjudications the right of judicial review is of mere secondary importance.
Establishment of fair and efficient procedures before administrative
bodies, especially in the matter of evidence before the administrative
agencies, possesses considerably greater practical significance. Both issues,
the question as to the scope of judicial review as also the problem of evidence, have been determined in litigation arising under the Railroad Retirement Act.
The section of the Railroad Retirement Act of 193712 dealing with court
review reads as follows:
COURT JURISDICTION

Sec. ii. An employee or other person aggrieved may apply to the district court of
any district wherein the Board may have established an office or to the District Court
of the United States for the District of Columbia to compel the Board (i) to set aside
an action or decision of the Board claimed to be in violation of a legal right of the applicant or (2) to take action or to make a decision necessary for the enforcement of a
legal right of the applicant. Such court shall have jurisdiction to entertain such application and to grant appropriate relief. The decision of the Board with respect to an
annuity, pension, or death benefit shall not be subject to review by any court unless
suit is commenced within one year after the decision shall have been entered upon the
records of the Board and communicated to the person claiming the annuity, pension, or
death benefit. The jurisdiction herein specifically conferred upon the Federal courts
shall not be held exclusive of any jurisdiction otherwise possessed by such courts to entertain actions at law or suits in equity in aid of the enforcement of rights or obligations
arising under the provisions of this Act or the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935.
It appears noteworthy that the provision lacks express language on the
scope of the court's jurisdiction with respect to determinations of ques-

tions of fact. 3 Specificprovisions in that regard are found in many federal
"This section alone is now applicable to court reviews, whether a case arises under the 1937
act or whether it is a case which, in accordance with the provisions of the 1937 act (§ 202), is
still to be adjudicated under the 1935 act. Section 9 of the 1935 act, which dealt with court
jurisdiction, has been wholly superseded by section i i of the 1937.act. With respect to the question here considered-the scope of judicial review-section 9 was no more informative than
section i i of the 1937 act; in fact, not even the words "review by any court," used in section ii
of the 1937 act, occurred in the i935 act.
The language of section xi of the 1937 act has been characterized as "rather unique." Final
Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 83 (i94).
13 Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 899 (1943), discussing
a number of Supreme Court cases on the scope of judicial review, attempts to show that the
courts have 'had great difficulty in distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of
law, and that recently this distinction has given way to a pragmatic test: which body-court or
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statutes and, in fact, have been included in recent legislation as a matter of
general practice.1 For example, in the related field of general old-age and
survivors benefits section 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 5
provides specifically that: "The findings of the Board as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." While the language of the statutes concerning finality of findings of fact varies considerably, this so-called "substantial evidence" rule 6 is frequently specified in
federal legislation. It is contained, for instance, in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 the Civil Aeronautics Act of I938,11 the Securities Exchange
administrative agency-has the better expert qualification for deciding the issue presented.
While it cannot be denied that, as in other fields of law, so too in the field of judicial review no
clear distinction is feasible between questions of fact and questions of law, the test suggested
would not seem to offer a more workable standard.
The present article will be concerned with the review of questions of fact. With respect to
pure questions of law (questions of statutory interpretation) arising under the Railroad Retirement Act, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that this "is a field in
which courts are regarded as having some expertness just as administrative tribunals have
special knowledge of the recurring factual patterns in their several spheres of activity," and
that administrative decisions of questions of law with respect to matters as to which there was,
in the opinion of the court, no long administrative interpretation may be set aside "although

the Board's interpretation of the Act may not be plainly erroneous." Railroad Retirement
Board v. Bates, 126 F. 2d 642 (1942).

John Dickinson, judicial Review of Administrative Determinations, A Summary and
Evaluation, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 588, 592 (1941), suggests a more realistic and better solution of
the problem. Citing Brown Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 299 U.S. 393
(1937) , as suggesting such approach, he advocates a distinction between legal determinations
of a specialized character and determinations of settled legal principles which are not technical
in nature. With respect to the former-and the issues which were involved in the Bates case
obviously fell within that category-the courts should not disturb the administrative finding
"if there is room for reasonable doubt as to the correctness of the administrative determination," but should disturb the finding only if the error is "clear and palpable."'
'4 The "Administrative Procedure Bill," supra, note ii, which is a proposal contemplating
a uniform system for all peace-time activities of the federal government, contains an elaborate
provision (§ 9 (f) ) on the scope of judicial revieiv. With respect to the review of determinations
of fact, it is provided that administrative actions may be set aside if "unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, upon the whole record as reviewed by the court, in
any case in which the action, rule, or order is required by statute to be taken, made, or issued
after administrative hearing." Limitation of the substantial evidence rule in that manner
would appear undesirable with respect to the federal disbursing agencies (which require informal adjudication of large numbers of small claims), in view of the formality required for
such hearings by the proposed bill. Doubts might even be raised under that bill as to the applicability of the substantial evidence rule to the determinations under the Railroad Retirement Act; see infra, pp. 56 ff.
s53 Stat. x368 (1939) 42, U.S.C. § 405 (g).
x6For

an illuminating discussion of the rule see Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Adminis-

trative Law, 89 U.of Pa. L. Rev. 1026 (1941). See also Pennock, Administration and the Rule
of Law, pp. r48 fE.(1941); 2 Vom Baur, Federal Administrative Law, §§ 575-595 (I942); Chainberlain-Dowling-Hays, The Judicial Function in Federal Administrative Agencies p. 3 2 ff.
(1942).
27 52

Star. IO65 (1938) 29 U.S.C. § 210.

18s52 Stat. 1024,

49 U.S.C. § 646 (e).
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Act of 1934,' 9 the Public Utility Holding Company Act of J935,20 the Ino
vestment Company Act of i94 , the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,22
3
the Federal Power Act2 the Federal Alcohol Administration Act 2 4 the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act 2 5 and the Federal Communications Act of 1934.6 Other statutes, such as the National Labor Relations
Act,2 7 the Federal Trade Commission Act'21 the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act 2 9 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1933,3° make
findings of fact by the administrative body conclusive "if supported by
evidence"; sometimes, the only language found is that findings and orders
shall be "prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated" (orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to suits for reparation
awards).31
Under these circumstances the lack in the Railroad Retirement Act
of express language on the scope of judicial review of questions of fact was
bound to become an issue to be determined by the courts. To be sure, some
earlier statutes likewise lack language specifying the scope of judicial review. The outstanding example is the Interstate Commerce Act which for
many years was the most significant federal statute as regards the evolution of principles of administrative law. As originally enacted in 1887,32
section i6 of the act stipulated that a "report" of the commission should
be "prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated." The original procedure of the act, under which orders of the commission did not become
19
20

48 Stat 902, Is U.S.C. § 78 (y).
49 Stat. 835, is U.S.C. § 79x (a).

2154 Stat.

23

49 Stat. 86o (1935) i6 U.S.C. § 8251 (b).
Stat. 98o (i935) 27 U.S.C. § 204 (h).

x5 U.S.C. § 8oa-42 (a).

24 49

- 54 Stat. 856, 15 U.S.C. § 8ob-13 (a).

2252

842,

Stat. 1053 (1938) 21 U.S.C. § 355 (h).

With reference to orders of the Federal Communications Commission granting or denying
construction permits, station licenses, and renewals or modifications thereof, or suspending a
radio operator's license: 48 Stat. 1094,47 U.S.C. § 402 (e) ("findings of fact by the Commission,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless it shall clearly appear that the
findings of the Commission are arbitrary or capricious.")
2

2749
2852

Stat. 454 (1935) 29 U.S.C. § 16o (e).
Stat. 113 (1938) 15 U.S.C. § 45(c).

29 52 Stat. ioi
(1938) 45 U.S.C. § 355 (f). A proposed bill, the "Railroad Social Insurance
Act" ( 78th Cong., 2d Sess., S. igix, H.R. 4805) which would amend the Railroad Retirement
and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Acts, likewise contains an express provision
(§ 407 (g)).
30 48 Stat 8o, r5 U.S.C. § 77 (i).

31 § 16 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 34 Stat. 59o, as amended by Act, June i8, 1910,
ch. 309, § 13, 36 Stat. 554, 49 U.S.C. § i6 (2); and § 3o8 (e) of the Interstate Commerce Act
(concerning water carriers) added by Act of September r8, i94o, ch. 722, title II, § 201, 54 Stat.
940, 49 U.S.C. 908 (e) (Supp. 1942).
3' 24

Stat. 379, 385 (X887).
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operative without the intervention of a court, amounted substantially to a
new trial in the courts. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that even at
that time judicial statements were made to the effect that it is not a function of the courts to weigh the evidence adduced; for example, whether
because of dissimilar circumstances and conditions a carrier was justified,
when engaged in the transportation of foreign freight, to charge more for a
shorter than for a longer distance on its own line, was declared by the
Supreme Court in an early opinion to be a question "of fact, peculiarly
' ' 33
within the province of the Commission.
In 19o6 the so-called Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act was adopted and the provision on judicial review was substantially modified. 34 The prima facie evidence rule was retained only
as to suits for reparation awards, but abolished as to all other cases. However, the importance of the Hepburn Amendment lies in its provision
making the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (except those
for money damages) operative without intervention of a court, the burden
in the enforcement procedure being thereby shifted to the private parties
affected. It was after the enactment of the Hepburn Act, i.e., in the absence of specific statutory language on the scope of judicial review, that
the courts worked out the principles of judicial review in cases arising

under the Interstate Commerce Act.3 s
One of the leading cases is Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union
PacificRailroadCo., 36 involving a rate order of the commission. By section
15(1) of the act the commission is empowered to order the discontinuance
of any rate, regulation, or practice of a carrier subject to the act, which it
finds to be "unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly
33

194

Cincinnati, N.O. Tex.Pac. Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 184,

(I896).

34 Act of June 29, 19o6, ch. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 59r. In 1913 section ig (a), providing for a
valuation of the several classes of carrier property, was added to the Interstate Commerce Act
(Act of March i, 1913, ch. 92,37 Stat. 701, 49 U.S.C. § 19 (a)). Subdivision (i) of section ig (a)
provides that all final valuations by the commission "shall be prima facie evidence of the value
of the property in all proceedings under this chapter ....and in all judicial proceedings for the
enforcement of this chapter, and in all judicial proceedings brought to enjoin, set aside, annul,
or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission."
35For an interesting comparison of the judicial treatment accorded the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission and those of the Federal Trade Commission, see McFarland,
Judicial Control of.the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission,
1920-1930 (1933) (showing that a larger degree of administrative finality was granted by the
courts to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission-4in the absence of specific statutory
language-than to those of the Federal Trade Commission, whose governing act contains spedfic language, see supra, note 28).
36222 U.S. 541, at 547 (1912); see also Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913); Western Paper Makers' Chemical Co. v. United
States, 271 U.S. 268, 271 (1926); Virginia Railway v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 663 (1926.)
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preferential or prejudicial," and to prescribe rates, regulations, or practices that will be "just and reasonable." In the Union Pacific case Mr.
Justice Lamar used the following language, which has become a classic
pronouncement in the field of administrative law:
....the orders of the Commission are final unless (i) beyond the power which it
could constitutionally exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or (3)based upon a
mistake of law. But questions of fact may be involved in the determination of questions
of law, so that an order, regular on its fact, may be set aside if it appears that (4)the
rate is so low as to be confiscatory and in violation of the constitutional provision
against taking property without due process of law; or (5)if the Commission acted so
arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence, or without evidence to
support it; or (6) if the authority therein involved has been exercised in such an unreasonable manner as to cause it to be within the elementary rule that the substance,
and not the shadow, determines the validity of the exercise of the power .....
In determining these mixed questions of law and fact, the court confines itself to
the ultimate question as to whether the Commission acted within its power. It will not
consider the expediency or wisdom of the order, or whether, on like testimony, it would
have made a similar ruling. "The findings of the Commission are made by law prima
facie true, and this court has ascribed to them the strength due to the judgments of a
tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience." Ill. Cenl. v. I.C.C., 2o6 U.S.
441. Its conclusion, of course, is subject to review, but when supported by evidence is
accepted as final; not that its decision, involving as it does so many and such vast public interests, can be supported by a mere scintilla of proof-but the courts will not examine the facts further than to determine whether there was substantial evidence to
sustain the order.
These principles were applied by the Court to different types of rate
orders; they were applied, for example, in upholding an order of the commission permitting lower rail rates on sugar, to meet water competition
on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, 37 in sustaining an order of the commission under the long and short haul clause (section 4 of the act), 31 and
in upholding an order of the commission under the Transportation Act of
4
39
establishing divisions of joint rates among a group of carriers. D
192o
They were declared to be applicable also to other types of orders of the
commission, such as orders concerning the distribution of coal cars, 4' or
37Mississibpi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, at 286 (1934); "The
structure of a rate schedule calls in peculiar measure for the use of that enlightened judgment

which the Commission by training and experience is qualified to form ....
It is not the
province of a court to absorb this function to itself."
38 As amended by Act of June I8, 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 547; Intermountain Rate
Cases, 234 U.S. 476 (1914).
39 Ch. 91 § 4z8,4I Stat. 456,486, amending § 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.

§z5 (6).

New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 203, 204 (1923).
4' Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 215 U.S. 452, 470
(Ig9O).
41

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

orders that a certain reshipping privilege was an undue preference or advantage to a city.42
The practice of the courts in matters involving the Interstate Commerce Commission has been of considerable importance with regard to
many other federal agencies. One of the reasons is that a number of federal
statutes have borrowed their provisions on court review from the Urgent
Deficiencies Act of 1913,43 which was originally enacted for orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The Urgent Deficiencies Act, transferring to the district courts the jurisdiction possessed by the Commerce
Court 4 4 "to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission," was incorporated by
reference in several more recent statutes setting up other regulatory
schemes. It is of special interest that certain recent Supreme Court decisions on administrative finality arose under statutes in which this provision had been incorporated, but in which no additional language had
been inserted expressly limiting the scope of such judicial review.
Statutory provisions of such a character were involved in Tagg Bros.
Moorehead v. United States,45 Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States,46 and
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States47 (arising under the Packers
and Stockyards Act of I92I,41 the Shipping Act, 49 and the Federal Communications Act of 1934,50 respectively). In both the Tagg Bros. case and
the Swayne case the orders attacked were rate orders; in the former case
the Supreme Court stated:"'
A proceeding under § 316 of the Packers and Stockyards Act is a judicial review, not
a trial de novo. The validity of an order of the Secretary, like that of an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, must be determined upon the record of the proceedings before him,--save as there may be an exception of issues presenting claims of
constitutional right, a matter which need not be considered or decided now .... On all
42

United

43Act

States v. Louisville

& Nashville R.R., 235 U.S. 314 (1914).

of October 22, 1913; 38 Stat.

208, 219; 28 U.S.C. § 41, subd. (28); see, generally,
Relation of Interstate Commerce Commission Practice to Other Administrative
Proceedings, passim (ig39).

Miller, The
44

See Act of June 18, i9IO, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539.

45280 U.S. 420 (1930).
46 300

U.S. 297 (1937).

4842 Stat. 168, 7 U.S.C. § 2i7.

47 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
49 39 Stat. 738, 46 U.S.C. § 83o.
so 48 Stat. 1o64, 1093, 47 U.S.C. § 402 (a). An express provision making findings of fact of
the commission conclusive unless it appears clearly that they are arbitrary or capricious is contained in section 402 (e) of the act, but only with respect to certain specified orders, see supra,
note 26. The order which was involved in the Rochester case did not fall within that group.
S' 280 U.S. 420, at 443-444 (I93o).
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other issues his findings must be accepted by the court as conclusive, if the evidence before him was legally sufficient to sustain them and there was no irregularity in the
proceeding.
Comparing the Shipping Act with the Interstate Commerce Act, the
Supreme Court stated in the Swayne case :52
Both have set up an administrative agency to whose informed judgment and discretion Congress has committed the determination of questions of fact, on the basis of
which it is authorized to make administrative orders.
Such determinations will not be set aside by courts if there is evidence to support
them ....Whether a discrimination in rates or services of a carrier is undue or unreasonable has always been regarded as peculiarly a question committed to the judgment of the administrative body, based upon an appreciation of all the facts and circumstances affecting the traffic.
In the Rochester Telephone Corp. case the Federal Communications
Commission had ruled that that corporation was under the "control"
of the New York Telephone Company and thus subject to the act and the
commission's orders issued thereunder, requiring all telephone carriers
subject to the act to file schedules of their charges and to supply certain
other information. Reviewing the history of adjudications under the Interstate Commerce Act, Mr. justice Frankfurter thus formulated the doctrine of administrative finality, as developed by the Court in its "recognition of the Commission's expertise" :s3
Even when resort to courts can be had to review a Commission's order, the range of
issues open to review is narrow. Only questions affecting constitutional power, statutory authority and the basic prerequisites of proof can be raised. If these legal tests are
satisfied, the Commission's order becomes incontestable ..... So long as there is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it must stand ....Having found
that the record permitted the Commission to draw the conclusion that it did, a court
travels beyond its province to express concurrence therewith as an original question.
Administrative decisions of a type totally different from rate orders
were likewise held to be protected by the principle of administrative
finality, despite the lack of express statutory language to that effect. For
example, grants of disability benefits were thus treated. In Silberscheinv.
United States,5 4 the Director of the Veterans' Bureau, who was empowered by the War Risk Insurance Act55 to "decide all questions arising
52 300

U.S. 297, at 303-304 (1937).

s5307 U.S, 125, at 139 (i939).
54 266 U.S. 221 (1924).
55 Act of August 9,1921, ch. 57. § 2, 42 Stat. 148. Subsequently, a specific provision was
enacted (§ 5 of the World War Veterans' Act, 1924,43 Stat. 6o8) providing, with respect to the
director's decisions, that "all decisions of question of fact affecting any claimant ....
shall be
conclusive except as otherwise provided herein."
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under this Act," had discontinued the plaintiff's compensation on the
ground that his disability had ceased to be compensable. In the Court's
opinion the following statement occurs: s6
The statute which creates the asserted right, commits to the Director of the Bureau
the duty and authority of administering its provisions and deciding all questions arising
under it; and in the light of the prior decisions of this court, we must hold that his decision of such questions is final and conclusive and not subject to judicial review, at least
unless the decision is wholly unsupported by the evidence, or is wholly dependent upon
a question of law or is seen to be clearly arbitrary or capricious.
Orders under a federal workmen's compensation scheme (the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927)57 were
granted the same protection by the principle of administrative finality,

although the statutory language involved merely was that "if not in accordance with law, a compensation order may be suspended or set aside,
in whole, or in part, through injunction proceedings, mandatory or otherwise, brought by any party in interest." 8

The case of Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Co.,s9 involving a
determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission occasioned by
questions of labor relations, afforded the Supreme Court an opportunity
to enunciate generally the principles which determine whether or not the
scope of judicial review of factual questions is limited in a particular instance, notwithstanding failure of the specific statute to include express
language on the problem. In the Shields case the Interstate Commerce
Commission had determined for the purpose of, and as,provided by, the
Railway Labor Act, that a line operated by electric power was not an
"interurban" electric railway excepted from the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act.6" Mr. Chief justice Hughes, clearly stressing the paras6266 U.S. 221, at 225 (1924).
s 4 4 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901.
s" South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett. 309 U.S. 251 (i94o). The case does not con-

tain an elaborate discussion of the problem here under consideration, the court merely stating
(at pp. 257-258 ) : "So far as the decision .... turns on questions of fact, the authority to determine such questions has been confided by Congress to the deputy commissioner. Hence the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that his finding, if there was evidence to support it, was conclusive." Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162, 166 (1933); Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296
U.S. 280, 287 (1935). For lower court decisions on the same statute see Wheeling Corrugating
Co. v. McManigal, 41 F. 2d 593 (i93o) and Harris v. Hoage, 66 F. 2d SOI (1933).

s93o5"U.S. 177 (1938).
6 As amended by Act of June 21, 1934, 48 Stat, 185; 45 U.S.C. § 15x.The Railway Labor
Act's exemption provision is with respect to any "interurban" electric railway, unless it is
operating as a part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation. By that act the Interstate Commerce Commission is "authorized and directed upon request of the Mediation Board
or upon complaint of any party interested to determine after hearing whether any line operated
by electric power falls within the terms of this proviso." The Railroad Retirement Acts (§ i (a))
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mount significance of the intent of Congress, thus discussed the problem:6r
What is the scope of the judicial review to which respondent is entitled? As Congress
had constitutional authority to enact the requirements of the Railway Labor Act looking to the settlement of industrial disputes between carriers engaged in interstate commerce and their employees, and could include or except interurban carriers as it saw
fit, no constitutional question is presented calling for the application of our decisions
with respect to a trial de novo so far as the character of the respondent is concerned.
With respect to that question, unlike the case presented in United States v. Idaho, 298
U.S. IO5, where the Interstate Commerce Commission was denied the authority to determine the character of the trackage in question (Id., p. 107), the Commission in this
instance was expressly directed to make the determination. As this authority was
validly conferred upon the Commission, the question on judicial review would be simply whether the Commission had acted within its authority ....
.... The sole .... question would be whether the Commission in arriving at its
determination departed from the applicable rules of law and whether its finding had a
basis in substantial evidence or was arbitrary or capricious ..... That question must
be determined upon the evidence produced before the Commission.
This principle of the limitation of judicial review, as deduced from the

statutory scheme involved (not from any express ianguage), is shown in
its full significance by a comparison of the Shields case with two other
cases, likewise concerning an "interurban electric railway" exemption, in

which the judicial review was held not to be limited, namely Piedmont &
Northern Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission2 and United

States v. Chicago, North Shore & Milwaukee Railroad Co.6' In these cases
it was held that under the statutory scheme there involved the particular
determinations had not been intrusted to the authority of the Interstate

Commerce Commission. In both cases injunctions had been brought by
the government-in the former case against construction of an extension

without a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the commission (see section i, paragraphs 18-21 of the act), and in the latter case
against the issuance of securities or the assumption of liability in respect
of the securities of others without first having obtained authority from the
commission (sections 20 (a) and 12, paragraph i). It was held that, concontain similar provisions, and the rule of the Shields case would clearly seem to be applicable
to determinations of the Interstate Commerce Commission for railroad retirement purposes.
Continental National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago v. Chicago North Shore and Mil-

waukee Railroad Company, D.C. N.D. Ill. East Div., in equity No. 16156 (November 18,
1940), C.C.H., Railroad Unemployment Insurance Service, § 9179. Cf. Sprague v. Woll,
F. 2d 128, at 130 (194), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 669 (i94i).
61305 U.S. 177, at 184, i85 (1938).
6'

286

U.S.

299 (1932).

63 288

U.S. 1 (1933).
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trary to the Shields case, the determination of the "interurban electric
railway" exemption had not been intrusted to the authority of the com64
mission in such matters.
It was against this background that the courts were faced with the
problem of determining the scope of their jurisdiction in actions brought
under section ii of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937. As shown, sec-

tion ii is silent as to the scope of the courts' review of questions of fact,
although there are some indications in the language of section ii suggesting that the court jurisdiction provided for does not contemplate a trial
de novo: such indications are the use of the word "review by any court,"
as also the fact that under section ii the courts are to set aside board decisions "claimed to be in violation of a legal right of the applicant," or to
take action "necessary for the enforcement of -alegal right of the applicant."' s (Italics supplied.)
In deciding the issue in question the courts were unable to obtain much
assistance from the legislative history of section ii of the 1937 act and, in

fact, none of the court opinions determining the scope of judicial review
under that section was based on the legislative history of the provision.
None of the Railroad Retirement acts (neither the act of 1934, nor the
acts of 1935 or 1937) contains an express provision giving administrative

finality to the factual determinations of the board; however, throughout
64Brown, op. cit., supra, note 13, in discussing this group of cases, attempts (at pp. 914,
915) to explain them by the suggestion that the task of applying even words without previous
legal connotations (such as the term "interurban electric railway") to the settled facts of a case
is frequently considered a question of law. Contrary to clear statements by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, Brown advances the following as an explanation of the Shields case: "Probably all the
case stands for, however, is that once the court has given the definition of the term, the determination of whether the particular road meets that definition is one of fact." There seems to
be no basis, in the opinions of the Court or in legal theory, for the suggestion that the character
of a question could thus be modified by the mere fact that the Supreme Court had occasion to
consider the term. The true reason for the difference between the Piedmont & Northern and
North Shore cases on the one hand, and the Shields case on the other, seems to lie in the different character of the determinations; under the statutory scheme, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, the commission is clothed with authoritative power with regard to determinations of the
kind involved in the Shields case, while no such power was intrusted to the commission with
respect to determinations such as were in issue in the two other cases.
Cf. also Texas Electric Ry. Co. v. Eastus, 25 F. Supp. 825, at 832 (1938), aff'd 308 U.S. 512
(1939), rehearing denied 3o8 U.S. 637 (1939), which reasoned that the distinction between the
Shields opinion on the one hand, and the Piedmont & Northern and Chicago, North Shore
cases on the other, lies in the fact that the Railway Labor Act was amended in 1934 so as to
authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission, upon request of the Mediation Board, to determine "after hearing" whether an electric line falls within the exemption proviso, and that
the two latter cases had been decided prior to that amendment. It should be noted, however,
that neither the Piedmont & Northern case nor the Chicago, North Shore case arose under the
Railway Labor Act.

s See South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, cited supra, note 58; under the statute
there involved an order can be suspended or set aside "if not in accordance with law."
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the history of the provisions for judicial proceedings there is a clear emphasis on "judicial review" in characterizing the nature of the proceedings.
The title "Judicial Review" was given to the sections on judicial proceedings (article V) in some of the earliest bills which were concerned with railroad retirement legislation, S. 3892 and H. R. 10023, 72d Congress, ist
Session, introduced in the year 1932, and S. 1529 and H. R. 4596, 73d
Congress, ist Session, introduced in 1933. The provisions in those bills
authorized the courts to set aside board decisions or to take other action
"when the applicant shall establish his right to a judicial review." (Italics
supplied.) This language, suggesting that no trial de novo was contemplated, was carried into section io of the 1934 act, and the same indication
is evident from the language of section ii of the 1937 act.
True, in section ii of the bills first introduced in 1937 (H. R. 6956 and
S. 2395, 75th Cong., ist Sess.) a provision appeared that "in any such
suit, the findings of the Board as to facts, unless contrary to the weight of
the evidence, shall be binding upon the court." But neither H.R. 6956 nor
S. 2395 ever became law. The House committee did not report on H.R.
6956, but instead reported favorably on a substitute bill, H.R. 7519,
which did not include the provision in question. The Senate then adopted
H.R. 7519, which was passed by both Houses of Congress and became the
1937 act. In view of the fact that, at the hearings before the House committee leading to the-replacement of H. R. 6956 by H. R. 7519, deletion of
the provision here in question was never specifically suggested, and in
view of the fact that there is nothing in the hearings or the committee reports or the proceedings on the floor of Congress giving any indication
whatever as to why the provision was not included in the new bill, it is
obviously impossible under the rules of statutory construction to draw any
conclusion as to Congressional intent from the omission. Any attempt to
draw a conclusion would be mere speculation, especially when it is realized
that during the steps leading to the enactment of the 1937 act the
provision on court jurisdiction was never acted on specifically by either of
the committees or Houses of Congress, but that there was simply a substitution for the original bill of an entire new bill in which the deletion of
the provision in question represented one of many changes. Accordingly, it
is impossible to determine why the provision in question was not included
in the new bill and whether the deletion thereof was considered as narrowing, broadening, or leaving unchanged, the scope of judicial review. Consequently, it is not permissible to base any conclusion on the omission of
the provision in question from the 1937 act.
However, the statutory scheme of the Railroad Retirement acts dem-
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onstrates conclusively that the authority to make determinations regarding the social insurance benefits provided for in the acts was clearly
committed to the Railroad Retirement Board so that, in accordance with
the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, findings of fact by the
board are conclusive, if supported by substantial evidence-notwithstanding the absence of express language to that effect. Special fitness of the administrative agency for deciding the factual questions involved, its "expertise"-declared by the Supreme Court to be the basis and justification
of the doctrine of administrative finality-is peculiarly manifest in the
case of the Railroad Retirement Board, in that under section io (a) of the
1937 act special qualifications are required for membership upon the
board.66 According to that provision the Railroad Retirement Board shall
be composed of three members: "One member shall be appointed from recommendations made by representatives of the employees and one member shall be appointed from recommendations made by representatives of
carriers, in both cases as the President shall direct, so as to provide representation on the Board satisfactory to the largest number, respectively,
of employees and carriers concerned." 6 7
That the determinations regarding the benefits of the railroad retirement system were intrusted to the Railroad Retirement Board, acting in
the capacity of an administrative tribunal, clearly follows, also, from L
number of other provisions of the act: It follows from section io (b)
which, entitled "Duties" of the board, provides that the board "shall have
and exercise all the duties and powers necessary to administer this Act
and the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935"; and that "decisions by the
Board upon issues of law and fact relating to pensions, annuities, or death
benefits shall not be subject to review by any other administrative or accounting officer, agent, or employee of the United States." It is especially
clear from subsection 2 of section io (b), which reads as follows:
If the Board finds that an applicant is entitled to an annuity under the provisions
of this Act or the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935 then the Board shall make an award
66

The same was true under the 1935 Act (§ 6 (a)). A similar rule applies to the board's
appeals council set up by the board as an intermediate appellate board under the authority of
section io (b) (5). According to section 260.2 (a) of the board's Regulations (4 Fed. Reg. 1502
(April 7, 1939); 20 Code Fed. Reg. 260.2 (a)), four of the fivemembers of the appeals council
shall have backgrounds of experience in the railroad industry.
67See also section xo (b) (4) of the act according to which in the employment of board employees under the civil-service laws and rules the board "shall give preference over all others to
individuals who have had experience in railroad service, if, in the judgment of the Board, they
possess the qualifications necessary for the proper discharge of the duties of the positions to
which they are to be appointed," and section i5 (c) directing the board to select two actuaries,
"one from recommendations made by representatives of employees and the other from recommendations made by representatives of carriers," for an actuarial advisory committee with
respect to the Railroad Retirement Account.
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fixing the amount of the annuity and shall certify the payment thereof as hereinafter
provided; otherwise the application shall be denied.

It should further be noted that it is provided in subsection 4 of section
xo (b) that the board shall "establish and promulgate rules and regulations
to provide for the adjustment of all controversial matters arising in the
administration of such Acts, with power ....

to require and compel the

attendance of witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, and make all
necessary investigations in any matter involving annuities or other payments"; that the board is given power to require all employers and employees, and officers, boards, commissions, etc., of the United States, to
furnish information necessary for the administration of the acts; and that
upon suit by the board the United States district courts are given jurisdiction to compel obedience to any order of the board issued pursuant to
this section.
The intent of Congress thus can dearly be gathered from the statutory
scheme of the Railroad Retirement Act. It was to set up the Railroad Retirement Board as a genuine administrative tribunal possessing all powers usually enjoyed by such tribunals, and to entrust it with the authoritative determination of questions of fact arising in the administration of
the icts. It was so held by the courts in a number of cases and, in fact, no
decision of any court ever denied the applicability of the principle of administrative finality to the determination of factual questions confided to
the board for administration.
The most extensive discussion of the problem is contained in two
opinions written by Judge Underwood of the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. In these two cases,
(South v. Railroad Retirement Board" and Holloway v. Railroad Retirenzent Board,19 identical language was used to show that the review contemplated by section 1i is a judicial review, not a trial de novo; i.e., that
the scope of review of questions of fact is limited under that section to determining whether there was substantial evidence in the record before the
board to support the attacked finding. Judge Underwood made the following statement in both opinions:7
68 43 F. Supp. 9x (1942).

1944 F. Supp. 59 (1942).

F. Supp. 9ri, at 912 (1942); 44 F. Supp. 59, at 6x (1942); see also the opinion in the
case of Dunlap v. Railroad Retirement Board, D.C. N.D. Ga., Civil No. 2459 (November 5,
1943), C.C.H. Railroad Unemployment Insurance Service, § 94o, in which Judge Underwood
stated: "This proceeding is a review of the Board's findings and not a proceeding de novo. The
findings under review must stand, if supported by substantial evidence and not in violation of
law. This was decided by this Court in the cases of Holloway v. Railroad Retirement Board
.... and South v. Railroad Retirement Board."
7043
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The determination of this question of fact was by the Act entrusted to the Board,
and its decision, if supported by substantial evidence, will not be set aside by the Court.
A review of the decision by a District Court is provided for in Section iiof the Act,
but the review contemplated by the Section is a judicial review, not a trial de novo.
The word "review" is used in the Section where it is provided that: "The decision of the
Board with respect to an annuity, pension, or death benefit shall not be subject to review by any court unless suit is commenced within one year after the decision," etc.
Where an administrative agency has been set up to whose informed judgment and
discretion Congress has committed the determination of questions of fact, on the basis
of which it is authorized to make administrative orders, "such determinations will not
be set aside by courts if there is evidence to support them. Even though, upon a consideration of all the evidence, a court might reach a different conclusion, it is not authorized to substitute its own for the administrative judgment." Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd.,
v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 303, 57 S.Ct. 478, 481, 81 L. Ed. 659. "So long as there
is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it must stand," and where
the Court has "found that the record permitted the Commission to draw the conclusion
that it did, a court travels beyond its province to express concurrence therewith as an
original question." Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145, 146, 59 S.
Ct. 754, 764, 83 L. Ed. 1147.
To hold otherwise would make the Board "but a mere instrument for the purpose
of taking testimony to be submitted to the courts for their ultimate action." (United
States v. Louisville & N. Railroad Co. 235 U.S. 314, 35 S. Ct. 113, 114, 59 L. Ed. 245);
and if it beheld that the Act requires a trial de novo and not a "review" of the Board's
decision, the hearing before the Board will accomplish little but delay.
The rule above stated is the rule uniformly applied to the findings of administrative
officials and boards charged with the duty of finding facts and subjected to review by
the courts when their orders are "not in accordance with law." Wheeling Corrugating
Co. v. McManigal, 4 Cir. 41 F. 2d 593, 594.
Such has been the rule announced in construing the following statutes and powers of
administrative officers [citing authorities].
Of the two cases only the South case was appealed and in the opinion of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"' the problem here under
consideration was treated as follows:
We think it too clear for argument that the statute in terms provides not for a trial
de novo but for a review of the Board's proceedings and for an affirmance of the order
and decision unless it is made to appear that the order is without legal support, that is,
that it is either without evidence to support it, or is based on an incorrect theory of
law. It is elementary law, as well in cases where statutory review is not provided for as
it6
cases where it is, tnat the findings and decisions of administrative agencies, when
within the scope of the authority conferred upon them, may not be set aside or otherwise interfered with by the courts where they are supported by substantial evidence.
But it is especially true in the case of a statutory review on the record such as is provided here; that the jurisdiction and function of the court is supervisory and not original; that it is to review the findings and order for error and not to retry the matter; and
71 131

F. 2d 748, at 750

(1942),

cert. denied, 317 U.S. 701 (i943).
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that the order under review must stand, if supported by substantial evidence, and not
in violation of law.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit likewise held that
the principle of administrative finality is applicable to the board's determinations of questions of fact. Citing the above-mentioned cases as
72
precedents, the court stated in Ellers v. RailroadRetirement Board:
In an action to review a decision of the Board, the merits of the plaintiff's claim are
not to be tried de novo. The only issue open as to the facts is whether the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence [citing cases] .... Even when a court upon
a consideration of all the evidence might reach a different conclusion, it may not substitute its own for the administrative judgment.

Finally, reference may be made to two additional district court opinions
in which the same principle was expressed: Bruno v. Railroad Retirement
Board 7 3 and Taylor v. Latimer, RailroadRetirement Board14 and to a number of unreported decisions by district courts also applying the doctrine of
administrative finality to determinations by the board.7 5
This application of the principle of administrative finality to determinations under the Railroad Retirement Act, in the absence of express
statutory language, is a recognition of the clear trend of American administrative law. In the development of judicial review administrative
finality of factual determinations by administrative agencies 76 has become
72

132

73 47

F. 2d 636, at 639, 640 (i943).

F. Supp. 3 (1942).

F. Supp. 236, at 238 (1942): "It is the law which needs not be supported by the citation of authorities that, on reviewing the order or decision of an administrative board, a court
or judge can go no further than to ascertain if the decision is supported by substantial testimony, and, if so, such decision cannot be overruled and must be confirmed."
7s Carey v. Murray Latimer, M.R. Reed and L. M. Eddy, Railroad Retirement Board,
W.D. N.Y., Civil No. i1o9 (June 2, 1943); Wing v. Railroad Retirement Board, D. Colo.
Civil No. 438 (December 21, 2942); Frawley v. Latimer, D. N.J., Civil No. 3199 (June 6, 1944),
and the following decisions by the district court for the District of Columbia: Bray v. Railroad
Retirement Board, Civil No. 8211 (January 5, 1943); Morris v. Railroad Retirement Board,
Civil No. 2o629 (May 28, 1942); and Van Natta v. Railroad Retirement Board, Civil No.
74 47

4387 (January 9, 1940).

The following unreported decisions in which the actions were voluntarily dismissed by the
plaintiffs, are to the same effect: Donahue v. United States of America, Railroad Retirement
Board, Morris W. Latimer, M. R. Reed, and L. M. Eddy, S.D. Iowa, Cent. Div., Civil No.
io9 (February 21, 1941); and by the District Court for the District of Columbia: Canfield v.
Railroad Retirement Board, Civil No. 14264 (May 4, 1942), and Bray v. Railroad Retirement
Board, Civil No. 8211 (January 28, 1941).
76 A comprehensive exposition of the doctrine of judicial review in its different aspects was
furnished by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in the case of St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73-93 (1936); for a general discussion of the relationship between courts and administrative agencies, see also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
the case of Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 3o9 U.S. 134
(1940) (stressing that the technical rules derived from the interrelationship of judicial tribunals
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the general method in which the practical requirement of expertness in
administering legislation has been reconciled with the tenet of AngloAmerican law which rejects the continental European practice of special
administrative law courts," entirely separate from, and not integrated
with, the machinery of the ordinary courts. While the above-mentioned
decisions under the Railroad Retirement Act are not the first cases in
which the principle of administrative finality was held to govern even in
the absence of specific statutory language, they are nevertheless of special
interest in any general appraisal of the evolution of administrative law.
They indicate the extent to which the principle of administrative finality
applies to different kinds of administrative action and in different forms of
court review. The earlier cases, discussed on the preceding pages, involved
other forms of administrative activity, and arose under other procedures.
Most of them were concerned with regulatory bodies, primarily with rate
and other orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission and certain
other agencies. And, while of a somewhat different regulatory nature, the
determination which gave rise to the Shields opinion likewise was a determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The decisionsivhich
arose under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
concerned a totally dissimilar administrative function, namely a govern-,
mental regulation of "private rights." Different from the railroad retirement cases, they did not involve any "disbursing" activity on the part of
the government. Only the Silberschein case, which arose under the War
Risk Insurance Act, was a case falling within the same category of governmental activity as the railroad retirement legislation. However, different
from the cases under the Railroad Retirement Act, the Silberschein case
arose under the procedure of the Tucker Act (section 24 (20) of the Judicial Code);Ts the procedural machinery of the other cases was a so-called
"statutory bill in equity."'79 The procedure established by section ii of the
Railroad Retirement Act, on the other hand, by authorizing the courts not
only to set aside board decisions but also to take action or to make deforming a hierarchical system should not be mechanically applied to the judicial review over
administrative agencies). Of course, textbook discussions of the problems involved are legion;
see, e.g., two publications written from opposite points of view: Frank, If Men Were Angels
(1942), especially pp. 179 ff., and Pound, Administrative Law (1942), in particular pp. 57-84.
77 Such as the hierarchy of tribunals culminating in the conseil d'6tat in France and the
hierarchy of "Verwaltungsgerichte" in Germany.
7828 U.S.C. § 41 (20).

79The procedure for reviewing orders under the Urgent Deficiencies Act and the similar
procedure under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act; see Chamberlain-Dowling-Hays, The Judicial Function in Federal Administrative Agencies i66 ff. (1942).
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cisions necessary for the enforcement of legal rights, grants powers to reviewing courts somewhat in excess of the powers ordinarily conferred by
statutory bills in equity. It partakes, at least to some extent, of the nature
of a so-called "statutory appeal."8 "
The application of the principle of administrative finality to the railroad retirement cases thus clearly demonstrates that in the field of federal 8'
administrative law this doctrine has obtained recognition as a rule of general applicability, even in the absence of specific statutory language, and
has become a rule applicable to different governmental functions and in
various procedural schemes.
Section 9 (f) of the recent "Administrative Procedure Bill" proposed by
the American Bar Association provides with respect to the review of determinations of fact that the court shall set aside administrative determinations if it finds them:
(5) unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, upon the whole
record as reviewed by the court, in any case in which the action, rule, or order is required by statute to be taken, made, or issued after administrative hearing, or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts in any case are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
Section 6 of the bill specifies that no administrative procedure shall satisfy
the requirement of a full hearing unless certain formal conditions are complied with, such as the condition that a hearing be held by the ultimate
authority of the agency, by hearing officers designated by the agency from
members of the highest authority in the agency, or by fulltime examiners,
and the condition that rules of evidence be observed; and section 7 of the
bill demands a certain formality in the decisions, namely preparation of
initial decisions or intermediate reports, preparation of statements of
reasons, findings of fact, and conclusions of law, etc. Sections 6 and 7, as
well as certain other provisions of the bill-if intended to apply to the
Railroad Retirement BoardS2--would seem inappropriate for administerso Typical examples of which, fully developed, are the court review sections of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of ig35, supra, note 2o, and of the Social Security Act, supra,
note z5.
8

1With respect to the similar rule of New York administrative law, see Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York 328 ff. (942).
82Although the proposed bill does not appear to be unambiguous, it is possible that the
provisions of the bill on "adjudication," "hearings," etc., were never intended to apply to the
determinations of the board. See pamphlet entitled "Legislative Proposal on Federal Administrative Procedure," published by the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law in io44, at p. 28: "Of the two introductory exceptions to section 4, that limiting the application of the sections to those cases in which statutes require a hearing is the more
significant, because thereby are excluded the great mass of administrative routine as well as
pensions, claims, and a variety of similar matters in which Congress has intentionally or traditionally refrained from requiring an administrative hearing."
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ing the railroad retirement legislation under which numerous small claims
must be promptly determined by the board. The existing procedure before
the board is non-adversary in character in that there are no "parties" before the board and in that the board does not assume the role of an opponent of the claimant; the "hearing" procedure of the proposed bill, on
the other hand, clearly contemplates adversary proceedings, controversial
in character. Informal adjudication would be permitted under the bill only
if a "controversy" is determined "by consent" (section 4 (b)), a rule
which would limit the existing practice of informal administration to a
restricted number of cases.
In addition, it might even be questioned whether the substantial evidence rule would continue to govern the scope of judicial review under the
Railroad Retirement Act. A doubt might be raised by the above-quoted
language of section 9 (f) of the proposed bill, according to which the substantial evidence rule shall apply in cases "in which the action .... is
required by statute to be taken ....

after administrative hearing." For

there is no express statutory language in the Railroad Retirement Act
which requires an administrative hearing before action is taken, although
an elaborate hearing machinery is provided for in the board's regulations. 83That, nevertheless, no change was intended by the proposed bill
would seem apparent from the following comment on subsection (f) of
section 9, made by the proponents of the Bill, the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law, in their recent pamphlet published in connection with the bill:8 4 "The subsection does not attempt to expand the scope of judicial review .... " and "It should be
noted that the sixth category, in accordance with the established rule,
would permit trial de novo to establish the relevant facts.... as to the

propriety of adjudications where there is no statutory administrative
hearing .... " The court decisions under the Railroad Retirement Act
discussed above (as also some of the other cases mentioned) demonstrate
that under existing law no express statutory language requiring administrative hearings is necessary for applying the substantial evidence rule.
Apparently, implied general requirements of a "hearing" in the broadest
sense of the term (such as the general requirement, included in the prohibition of "arbitrary" action, that some opportunity be given by the board
to a claimant to present his case) were considered sufficient by the proponents of the bill to bring an administrative determination within the
83Sections 250.7-250.16 of the Regulations; 4 Fed. Reg. i499 (April 7,
Reg. 250.7-250.16.
s4Op. cit. supra, note 82, at pp. 39, 40.

1939),

20 Code Fed.
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"established rule" of existing law limiting judicial teview to the substantial evidence test.
An attempt to apply the "Administrative Procedure Bill" to the activities of the other "disbursing" agencies of the federal government apparently would show the following: No difficulties, it seems, would be
brought about with respect to the judicial review of determinations by the
Veterans' Administration; in the case of pensions, compensation allowances, and special privileges judicial review is expressly precluded by
statute, s and the "Administrative Procedure Bill" (section 9 (h)) would
leave that situation unchanged; trial de novo is apparently now granted
in the case of war risk and national service life insurance claims,86 and it
seems that no change would be made in that respect by the "Administrative Procedure Bill." Uncertainty might be caused in the case of the Unit87
ed States Employees' Compensation Commission. The statute governing the activities of that agency (which provides for workmen's compensation to federal employees) does not mention judicial review but, at the
same time, does not contain a provision "expressly precluding judicial
review," such as is contemplated by section 9 (h) of the "Administrative
Procedure Bill." And since the statute may be construed as not requiring
an administrative hearing, a suggestion might even be made, if the declaratory judgment procedure as described in section 9 (b) of the bill should
be held applicable, that under the bill there should be a trial de novo with
respect to the facts in the case of that agency. The suggestion does not
appear sound to the writer, in addition to other reasons on the ground
that apparently no consent to suit against the United States, not even for a
declaratory judgment, is contained in the bill.
Finally, application of the bill to the Social Security Board would encounter the same objections concerning formality of procedure as were
raised in the case of the Railroad Retirement Board. No question, apparently, could be raised as to the continued application of the substantial
evidence rule contained in section 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, in
view of the statutory requirement of a hearing in the act, section 205 (g)
granting a right of court review to "any individual, after any final decision
of the Board made after a hearing to which he was a party ..... " (Italics
supplied.)
ss Act of March 20, 1933, ch. 3, title I, § 5, 48 Stat. 9, 38 U.S.C. 705.
86See Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 3 20, § 19, 43 Stat. 612, 38 U.S.C.445 , as amended. Cf. Hines
v. United States ex rel. Marsh, io. F. 2d 85 (1939); Kontovich v. United States, 99 F. 2d 66i
(1938), cert. denied, 3o6 U.S. 65i (1939); and Act of October 8, 1940, ch. 757, title VI, part I,
§ 617, 54 Stat. 1014, 38 U.S.C. 817.
87 Act of September 7, i916, ch. 458, § 36, 39 Stat. 749, 5 U.S.C. 786.
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"JURISDICTIONAL"

QUESTIONS

Only one court opinion under the Railroad Retirement Act qualified
the applicability of the principle of administrative finality to the board's
decisions of questions of fact. In Utah Copper Co. v. Railroad Retirement
5 the
Board, Nevada Consol. Copper Corp. v. Railroad Retirement Board,"
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit made an exception with
respect to so-called "questions of jurisdiction." The case involved the
issue whether certain individuals were "employees" within the meaning of
the Railroad Retirement Act. The court granted that as to all matters
confided to the board for administration:
....
its judgments are final and conclusive if supported by substantial evidence and
if free from arbitrary or capricious conduct. To hold otherwise would, in effect, be making of the Board a mere master to take the testimony and make recommendations of
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

However, it specifically excluded from that rule determinations of the
question whether certain individuals were covered "employees" within
the meaning of the act, s9 on the ground that that qtuestion is "one of jurisdiction." Contending that the act is "silent on the power of the Board
to pass upon the question of jurisdiction," the court concluded that:
.
in the absence of a specific provision in the act, expressly lodging the decision
of the jurisdictional question in the Board, its decision, even if supported by competent evidence, is not final and may be independently examined by a court of review.

By making a reference to the concept "jurisdictional question," the
court wandered into nebulous territory. The term "jurisdictional question"
is customarily used in discussions of administrative law in connection
with the doctrine of the celebrated case of Crowell v. Benson.90 The doc88 129

F. 2d 358, at 361 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 687 (1942).

89 The

opinion indicates clearly that in the view of th~e court the issue as to whether a com-

pany is an "employer" within the meaning of the act is also considered a "question of jurisdiction," and thus under the theory of the court may likewise be examined independently by thereviewing court. Section i (b) of the 1937 act, in defining the term "employee" for the purposes
of the act; uses the term "employer," which term is also specifically defined for thepurposes of
the act (§ i (a) of the act).
90 285 U.S. 22 (1932). The case is one of the most widely discussed opinions in the field of
administrative law. For analyses see, e.g., Black, The "Jurisdictional Fact" Theory and Ad-

ministrative Finality, (1937) 22 Corn. L.Q. 349, 515; Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial
Review of Administrative Determination of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 8o U. of Pa.
L. Rev. ios5 (1932), 4 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 993 (1938); Landis, The Administrative Process i31-36 (1938); Hart, Judicial Review of Administrative Action: A Thesis,
(I941) 9 Geo. W. L. Rev. 499, 5o9; Green, The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative
Action,

12

Rocky Mt. L.Rev. 173, i8o (i94o). A comprehensive discussion is furnished by

Chamberlain-Dowling-Hays, The Judicial Function in Federal Administrative Agencies 205207 (1942). For a pungent statement concerning the complexities raised by the doctrine of
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trine of that case, however, is clearly inapplicable to determinations under the Railroad Retirement Act. The doctrine of Crowellv. Benson, as the
Supreme Court there stated, 9x applies only to cases involving "private
rights" (as are involved in the workmen's compensation scheme of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act under which
that case arose) and then only to "constitutionaljurisdictional facts"; i.e.,
a trial de novo of findings of an administrative agency is demanded by
the Crowell v. Benson doctrine merely with respect to administrative determinations of facts upon which constitutional rights depend. 92 Of course,
no such "private rights" can be involved in the system of governmental
social insurance benefits which is provided for by the railroad retirement
legislation. That legislation can give rise only to the other kind of cases,
specifically excluded by the Supreme Court from the application of the
Crowell v. Benson doctrine, namely to cases "which arise between the
Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the
performance of the constitutional functions of the exicutive or legislative departments." Moreover, no issues of "constitutional jurisdictional
93
fact" are presented by the application of the Railroad Retirement Act.
In fact, the court in the Utah Copper Co. case did not cite the Crowell v.
Benson decision and no attempt was made in the Utah opinion to predicate
the conclusion on any principle of constitutional law. Divested of the
sacrosanct implications of constitutional law with which, due to the
Crowell v. Benson doctrine, problems of "jurisdiction" are ordinarily as"jurisdictional questions" in the subject of administrative law, see Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, at 695 (1944): "The opinions in
Crowdl v. Ben on, 285 U.S. 22, and the casuistries to which they have given rise bear unedifying testimony of the morass into which one is led in working out problems of judicial review
over administrative decisions by loose talk about jurisdiction."
9' 285 U.S. at pp. 5o, 57; cf. also Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 49,
5o (r938); see commefit in 26 Cal. L. R. 683 (x938), and Dickinson, Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations, A Summary and Evaluation, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 588, 597 (i94I)
(correctly limiting the case to a situation in which the administrative power is used for the purpose of determining rights and liabilities between private individuals); and Blachly-Oatman,
Federal Regulatory Action and Control 124 ff. (1940)
9' 285 U.S. at p. 56: "It is the question whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative
agency-in this instance a single deputy commissioner-for the final deternlination of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend." See Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Co., supra, note 59, footnote 13; Perkins v.
Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F. 2d 2o8, at 224 (1942), aff'd sub nom. Endicott Johnson Corp.
v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
93See supra, p. 28. Cf. also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the old-age benefits provisions of the Social Security Act under the generalwelfare clause of the Constitution).
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sociated in writings on administrative law, the issue of "jurisdictional
questions," as propounded in the Utah Copper case, thus assumes an undistinguished character and becomes a pure matter of statutory interpretation.
It is clear that, as a matter of policy, there is no justification for applying any doctrine of "jurisdictional facts" to the determinations under the
Railroad Retirement Act. As stated by Dickinson, 94 re-examination of
"jurisdictional facts" grew Up in connection with the review of summary
official acts taken as a result of decisions not based on a formal hearing
preserved in a record.
Where an administrative decision of fact is of a kind reached by an official simply as
a result of a rough-and-ready personal inspection preliminary to summary action, it
does not stand on all fours, so far as concerns the weight to which it is entitled, with a
decision made as a result of a formal administrative hearing protected by procedural
safeguards. A decision of fact made by a dairy or meat inspector as a preliminary to
summary destruction of food is clearly not on the same footing with a decision of the

Interstate Commerce Commission.
Obviously, determinations under the Railroad Retirement Act are not
fact-findings "reached as result of a rough-and-ready personal inspection
preliminary to summary action"; on the contrary, an elaborate hearing
machinery was set up by the board in implementing the Congressional

direction of section io (b) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 to "establish and promulgate rules and regulations to provide for the adjustment of all controversial matters arising in the administration of such
Acts" (the Railroad Retirement Acts of 1935 and 1937).9"

In the Utah Coppercase the Circuit Court relied for its conclusion on the
decision of United States v. Idaho,9' in which case the Supreme Court had
held that the determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission
there involved was "left by Congress to the decision of a court-not to the
final determination of either the federal or a state commission." But the
determination which had formed the basis for the Idaho decision was
fundamentally different from the coverage determinations under the
Railroad Retirement Act. The case was a so-called abandonment case
under the Interstate Commerce Act. By that act, the Interstate Commerce Commission is given authority to deteimine whether convenience
and necessity permit the abandonment of a line of railroad, "spurs" being
94 So

U. of Pa. L. Rev. io6o ff.

(1932),

4 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 998 ff.

(1938).
9s See §§ 250.7-250.16 of the board's Regulations; 4 Fed. Reg. 1499-(April 7, 1939), 20 Code
Fed. Reg. 250.7-250.6.
9 298 U.S. 105 (I936).
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specifically excepted from such authority (section i (22)). Under the
statute anzy party in interest can bring suit to enjoin an unauthorized
abandonment, but an interested party other than a carrier cannot initiate
before the commission any proceeding to determine whether or not a
certain trackage is a "spur"; the only method by which such other interested party can secure a determination is by application to the court.
Thus, Under the statutory scheme of the Idaho case, independent judicial
determinations of the jurisdictional question clearly were contemplated,
regardless of whether the Interstate Commerce Commission had made a
determination and whether it was a party to the judicial proceedings;
hence, the determination of the jurisdictional question could not possibly
have been committed to the commission. It was committed to the court.
Of course, it needs no elaboration to demonstrate that nothing similar
to such a situation can arise in the administration of the Railroad Retirement Act. The Railroad Retirement Board is one of the disbursing agencies of the federal government. It is not a "regulatory body" such as, for
example, the National Labor Relations Board, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, or the Federal Communications Commission. The Railroad
Retirement Act was not enacted for the purpose of establishing rules
regulating the conduct of individuals. Consequently, under the Railroad
Retirement Act there can be no "interested party" (as in the Idaho situation) which is both precluded from initiating proceedings before the agency and also limited by the statute in its freedom of action, in that its exercise of some pre-existing interest or right is made dependent upon an action of the board, as it was in the Idaho case. And there is also no special
machinery, either under the Railroad Retirement Act or under the Judicial Code generally, providing for independent judicial proceedings to
determine coverage questions under the Railroad Retirement Act, 97 as
there is in abandonment cases under the Interstate Commerce Act. In the
Idaho case the suit had not been directed to setting aside any order of the
commission; it was neither a so-called "statutory bill in equity" (such as
the procedure of the Urgent Deficiencies Act, under which many of the
Interstate Commerce Commission cases arise) nor a "statutory appeal,"
but was a suit brought under a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act
(section i (20)) under which an independent right is granted to apply to
the courts, disconnected from and not co-ordinated with the administrative procedure before the commission. Furthermore, even on more general grounds the Idaho opinion would seem to be of doubtful validity as a
precedent for determinations by the Railroad Retirement Board. Though
97 Cf. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
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the case is still good law, 98 its doctrine clearly is very exceptional and not
in accord with the general development of the law concerning administrative agencies; the Interstate Commerce Act, it should be noted, is the oldest federal statute setting up an administrative agency, and peculiar doctrines developed under its statutory scheme should not be extended to a
modern statute such as the Railroad Retirement Act, which was enacted
after the field of administrative law had witnessed a truly remarkable
evolution, especially when it is realized that the doctrine of the Idaho case
apparently was not extended, in any of the cases since reported, to any
agency other than the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The Idaho case, it is suggested, fails to lend any support to the result
reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals .for the Tenth Circuit in Utah
Copper Co. v. RailroadRetirement Board.
It likewise appears that a reference made in the Utah Copper opinion to
a statement by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the above-cited case 99 of
Shields v. Utah Idaho CentralRailroadCo. affords no support to the Court's
conclusion. Stating that "in the absence of a specific provision in the act
expressly, lodging the decision of the jurisdictional question in the Board"
the principle of administrative finality does not govern jurisdictional determirations, the court in the Utah Copper case cited as support a statement by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the Shields case that "the Commission in this instance was expressly directed to make the determination"
of the jurisdictional question. But by that language the Chief Justice was
merely describing the statutory provision of the Railway Labor Act which
was involved in that case. He did not intend to lay down any rule that
such express provision was a minimum requirement for the application
of the doctrine of administrative finality to jurisdictional determinations.
That such could not have -been the intention of the Chief Justice is apparent from the fact that the Shields case was cited in subsequent opinions
as authority for holding administrative determinations of jurisdictional
issues conclusive, although the pertinent statutes did not contain express
99 City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 689 (1944).In that case it was held, however, that when an application is made to a court to enjoin an unauthorized abandonment and
the aid of the commission has previously been invoked, the courts, becauise of the special competence of the commission with respect to the matters involved, should not make jurisdictional
determinations "without the basic jurisdictional findings first having been made by the Commission" (at p. 689). This requirement indicates recognition by the Court of the special expertness of administrative agencies even in instances in which the principle of administrative
finality is inapplicable, and might serve as a precursor signalizing the breakdown of the doctrine of the Idaho case.*
99 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
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provision granting power to make such determinations.,I ° In fact, application of the doctrine of administrative finality to jurisdictional determinations-aside from "constitutional" jurisdictional facts in cases involving "private rights"-has become so general as now to constitute a
well-established and consistent practice also when there is no express language in the respective statute dealing with jurisdictional questions. The
existence of such practice is shown not only by the opinions, listed in the
footnote, citing the Shields opinion, but also by some additional recent
cases in which no reference was made to the Shields decision, namely,
South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett,1x Rochester Telephone Corp. v.
United States,°2 Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,13 and National Labor
04
Relations Board v. HearstPublications.
In the Bassett case, which involved the Longshoremen's and Harbor

Workers' Compensation Act, the authority to determine whether an individual when he sustained his injuries was "a member of a crew""' s was
held to be confided to the authority of the deputy commissioner, the Chief
Justice relying on statutory provisions" which are no more specific with
respect to matters of jurisdiction than is the language of the Railroad Retirement Act. The Bassett case deserves special interest for two reasons:
loo The Shields case was so cited in the following opinions: Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States,
318 U.S. 73, at 8o (i943); O'Malley v. United States, 38 F. Supp. i, at 4 (z941); and Johnson
v. United States, 4 F. Supp. z88 (i94i). All three cases involved determinations of the Interstate Commerce Commission under the so-called "grandfather-clause" of the Motor Carrier
Act. The statutory provisions involved are sections 209 (a) and (b), and section 210 of the
Interstate Commerce Act. According to the proviso of section 209 (a) a permit for the performance of service as a contract carrier by motor vehicle shall be issued by the commission
without further proceedings "if any such carrier or a predecessor in interest was in bona fide
operation as a contract carrier by motor vehicle on July i, 1935." No provision of the Interstate Commerce Act confers express authority upon the commission to determine this jurisdictional question.
The Shields case was also so cited in Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, at 412 (94), which con-

cerned a determination of "producer" under the Bituminous Coal Act of 2937, 50 Stat. 72,
ch. 127, 15 U.S.C. § 828. This statute ceased to be effective on April 26, 1943. While the act
contained express provisions on the limited scope of judicial review and on the requirement of
hearings, there was no express provision in the act intrusting the Bituminous Coal Commission
with authority to make "producer" determinations. Section 4-A of the act, to be sure, specifically conferred power upon the commission to rule upon applications by producers for exemption from the act, but that provision failed to specify expressly the power to make "producer" determinations as such, at least in the express manner apparently demanded under the
test set up by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the Utah Copper opinion.
x01 309 U.S. 252 (294o).
203 317 U.S. 501 (194A).
U.S 125 (1939).
04 322 U.S.
11 (1944).
10SSection 3 of the act-33 U.S.C. § 9o3-(the section entitled "Coverage") specifically
excludes members of a crew from compensation benefits.
zo 33rU.S.C. 919 (a), 921.
"02307
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First, it was concerned with the same statute under which Crowell v.
Benson arose, thus suggesting that when the Court fails to find a constitutional issue, jurisdictional determinations are treated in the same manner
as other determinations.'0 7 Second, it was written by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes who had been the author of the Shields opinion, as also of the
majority opinion in Crowellv. Benson, a clear indication that in the Shields
opinion the Chief Justice did not purport to establish any rule such as the
circuit court in the Utah Copper case professed to find therein.
The Rochester Telephone case, a landmark of administrative law because
of its demolition of the so-called "negative order" doctrine, has some bearing on the subject here in question. Under an exemption provision of the
Federal Communications Act of 1 9 3 4!08 the Federal Communications
Commission shall not have jurisdiction with respect to "any carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication solely through physical connection With the facilities of another carrier not directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by, or under direct or indirect control with, such
carrier." Without citing any specific statutory provisions in support, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter held that determinations of the jurisdictional question of "control" under that provision were committed to the commission.109 Although the Communications Act contains detailed provisions
concerning the powers of the commission and the requirement of hearings,1 0 no express language is contained in that act conferring authority
upon the commission concerning determination of the jurisdictional issue
which was involved in the Rochester case.
The same is true with respect to Endicott Johnson v. Perkins, involving
a subpoena issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the WalshHealey Act."' It was held in that case that the principle of administrative
finality includes the Secretary's determination of coverage under that act.
Again, the statute contains no express language specifically intrusting the
Secretary with authority to determine the jurisdictional question of coverage." And it should be noted that in the recent case of National Labor
1o7 See also Hagens v. United Fruit Co., I35 F. 2d 842 (1943); Schantz v. American Dredging Co., i38 F. 2d 534 (1943).
xog§ 2 (b) (2); 48 Stat. io65 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 152 (b) (2).

109 307 U.S. 125, at 145 (1939).

110See e.g. 47 U.S.C. §§ 154 (i), 213 (a), 213 (f), 214 (d), 215, 221 (a); see also § 221 (c)
concerning classification of property of carriers engaged in wire telephone communication.
x2149 Stat. 2036 (1936) 41 U.S.C. § 35.
X2 The only provisions concerning the authority of the Secretary under the act are sections
4 and 5 (41 U.S.C. §§ 38 and 39), neither of which, however, is specifically concerned with the
question of coverage. Another recent Supreme Court decision in which despite the absence of
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Relations Board v. Hearst Publications,
which involved an "employee"
determination by the National Labor Relations Board-a determination
similar to the "employee" determinations under the Railroad Retirement
Act-the Supreme Court, citing among others its opinions in Gray v.
Powell, South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, and Rochester Telephone
Corp. v. United States, held that "the question who is an employee under
the Act.... 'belongs to the usual administrative routine' of the Board,"
and that "the Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a
reasonable basis in law." The Supreme Court did not even mention the
concept of "jurisdictional facts."
Clearly, there is no such special rule in the field of judicial review with
respect to "jurisdictional questions," as was contended for by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Utah Copper Co. v. Railroad
Retirement Board. In fact, in a more recent opinion which involved an
"employer" determination by the Railroad Retirement Board (Duquesne
Varehouse Co. v. RailroadRetirement Board"4), the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, though referring to the decision in the
Utah Copper Co. case (and citing Crowell v. Benson), held specifically that:
If the findings of fact which form the basis for the determination that Duquesne is
an "employer" within Section i (a) of the Retirement Act are supported by substantial
evidence, it is clear from reading the Act and the Regulations promulgated under the
Act that the Board has jurisdiction.

"Employer" and "employee" determinations under the Railroad Retirement Act, it appears, do not differ with respect to the board's authority
from any other determination to be made in the administration of the
Railroad Retirement Act. For the eligibility for, and the amount of,
awards under the Railroad Retirement Act are necessarily dependent upon "employer" as well as "employee" determinations.15 Such determinaexpress statutory language an incidental question of jurisdiction, at least implicitly, was held
covered by the principle of administrative finality, is the case of Swift & Co. v. United States,
316 U.S. 216, at 230, 23r (1942) (determination as to what constitutes "transportation" within
the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act; the only statutory language of the act dealing
with the authority exercised by the commission in that case (§ IS (I)), is directed to authorizing determinations with respect to the reasonableness of a carrier practice).
X13322 U.S. 1II,

130, 131 (1944).

" 56 F. Supp. 87, 89 (1944).
"3 Section 2 (a) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 (the provision determining "eligi-

bility" for "annuities") requires that the individuals shall have been "employees"; and, as
mentioned, the term "employee" is in turn defined (insection i (b)) by reference to the term
'.employer" (defined in section i(a)). The "pensions" payable under section 6 of the act are
to be paid to certain individuals who were on the pension or gratuity roll of an "employer."
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tions are therefore necessary in order to enable the board to carry out the
mandate of Congress to administer the railroad retirement legislation, and
the statutory provisions referred to"6 as the basis for applying the doctrine of administrative finality to the board's determinations generally,
are all-comprehensive and do not permit any exclusion of "jurisdictional
questions."
EVIDENCE BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

As mentioned, problems concerning evidence have arisen in litigation
under the Railroad Retirement Act. The problem as to whether, and to
what extent, rules of evidence must be observed by an administrative
agency, promises to become one of the most significant questions in the
field of administrative law. With the constant expansion of the field of
administration and with its assumption of an increasing number of varied
types of functions, the question of evidence is bound to arise under many
different circumstances. Peculiar to Anglo-American law due to the absence in so-called civil law countries of any comparable system of rules of
evidence, the problem of evidence in most instances must be considered by
the courtswithout the support of direct statutorylanguage. Different from
the question as to the .scope of the judicial review of administrative actions, express language on the question of evidence is found only in a very
limited number of federal statutes."7 For example, a specific provision that
the "rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling" was included in the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act
and the National Labor Relations Act;"18 section 15 (b) of the Natural
Gas Act "' 9 specifies that in the conduct of all hearings, investigations, and
proceedings under the act the "technical rules of evidence need not be applied"; and the Social Security Act, as amended,120 is especially explicit on
the subject in question by providing not only (in section 205 (b)) that
"evidence may be received at any hearing before the Board even though
inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to court procedure," but
by further specifying (in section 205 (c)) that the records maintained
x"6

Supra, pp. 39-4i.

Express provisions freeing the commissions from the rules of evidence are contained in
many of the state workmen's compensation statutes.
ri8 § 5 (e) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (52 Stat. ixoo (1938) 45 U.S.C.
§ 355 (e)); § io (b) of the National Labor Relations Act (49 Stat. 453 (1935) 29 U.S.C. §
16o (b)). The provision of the National Labor Relations Act was considered and interpreted in
numerous court decisions.
117

52 Stat. 830 (1938) 15 U.S.C. § 717n.
12°
53 Stat. 1369 (1939) 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (b) and (c).

"9
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by the Social Security Board of the amounts of the wages paid to each individual and of the periods in which such wages were paid, "shall be evidence, for the purpose of proceedings before the Board or any court, of the
amounts of such wages and the periods in which they were paid, and the
absence of an entry as to an individual's wages in such records for any
period shall be evidence that no wages were paid such individual in such
period."
Since such express language is very rare in federal statutes, the courts
frequently have based their conclusion of the inapplicability of the strict
common law rules of evidence upon statutory provisions of a more general
character. Provisions establishing the substantial evidence rule or declaring that the jurisdiction of the administering'officials shall include the
power to make the rules of their own procedure have been construed to
contain an implied sanction of the independence of such officials from the
jury-trial rules of evidence.21I For example, the rule of the Federal Trade
Commission Act limiting the scope of judicial reviewl 2l has been construed
to permit admission of legally incompetent testimony.123

A general statement concerning the inapplicability of the technical exclusionary rules of evidence to proceedings before federal administrative
agencies was made by Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Stone in the wellknown Opp Cotton Mills case,' 24 which case, together with United States v.
Darby,2 5s decided the same day (February 3, 194), upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The Opp Cotton Mills

case, a landmark in the field of public law because of its extensive discussion and modern interpretation of the problem of delegation of legislative
powers,i26 contains some discussion of the problem here under consideration. In connection with the question as to whether a finding of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor
See i Wigmore, Evidence p. 44 (3 d ed. i94o); for a discussion of the similar rule of New
York law, see Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York p. 171 ff.
121

(1942).
12

Supra, note 28.

"23Hills Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9F. 2d 481, 484 (1926); Arkansas Wholesale
Grocers' Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 18 F. 2d 866 (1927); John Bene &Sons v. Federal

Trade Commission,

299 Fed. 468, at 471 (1924): ...... evidence or testimony, even though
legally incompetent, if of the kind that usually affects fair-minded men in the conduct of their
daily and more important affairs, should be received and considered."
124 312 U.S. 126 (i941).
12s312

U.S. 1oo (1941).

,6 For a discussion of the comparative-law aspects of that problem, see the writer's article.

Delegation of Powers and Judicial Review, 36 Col. L. Rev. 871 (1936), 4 Selected Essays on
Constitutional Law 316 (938).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

was supported by substantial evidence (the Fair Labor Standards Act
contains a provision that "findings of fact by the Administrator when
supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive"), objection had
been made by the Petitioners to the class of evidence included in the record, such as statistical publications by thfe Bureau of Labor Statistics,
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission,
and the Wage and Hour Division. Rejecting the petitioners' argument,
Mr. Justice Stone stated :127
The argument of petitioners is not that the record contains no evidence supporting
the findings but rather that this class of evidence must be ignored because not competent in a court of law. But it has long been settled that the technical rules for the exclusion of evidence applicable in jury trials do not apply to proceedings before federal
administrative agencies in the absence of a statutory requirement that such rules are
28
to be observed [citing cases.]"
That the common law rules of evidence, on general principles, should
not be applied to inquiries of fact determinable by administrative tribunals has often been the subject of discussion by legal writers. As stated by
Wigmore,"19 there is no historical justification for applying the rules of
evidence, for they grew up exclusively in jury trial and therefore do not
apply "ex stricto jure" in any tribunal but a jury court. Numerous arguments of policy, also, are advanced against application of the rules of evidence, especially in the case of non-adversary administrative proceedings;
the requirements of the rules of evidence are declared to be inconsistent
with the prime objectives of administration, viz., the objectives of despatch, elasticity, and simplicity;130 because of the fact that administrative tribunals are composed of experienced professional men, habitually
inquiring day after day into the same limited class of facts, an expert
127 At

p. i55.
See also United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133 (1924), a deportation case,
in which Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that in deciding whether a warrant of deportation should
stand, the test is not "whether the evidence was such that, if introduced in a court of law, it
would-be held legally sufficient to prove the fact found."
29 Evidence (3d ed. 194o) vol. i, p. 27.
128

130 Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 70
(94i) see also Stephens, Administrative Tribunals and the Rules of Evidence (x933); Davis,
An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364
(1942), and 2 Vom Baur, Federal Administrative Law § 579 (1942); but see also Riedl, Should
Rules of Evidence Govern Fact-Finding Boards? 23 Marq. L. Rev. 13 (1938). An interesting
discussion of the problem here in question, with an examination of the applicability of certain
specific rules of evidence, is furnished by Stephan, The Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards
Should be Bound by Rules of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 630 (1938); see also Miller, Application of
Rules of Evidence to Fact-Finding Boards, 17 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 145 (i939). For a recent
discussion see Merrill, Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings, a Functional Prospectus,
23 Nebr. L. Rev. 56, 64-68 (1944).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND RAILROAD LEGISLATION

weighing of evidence can generally be counted upon, and therefore there
is no justification for applying the rules of evidence, most of which are
merely rules of caution designed to exclude possible sources of error; the
courtroom rules of evidence are declared to be manifestly inappropriate
for many of the administrative procedures which require investigative
techniques; furthermore, it is suggested that imposition of the jury-trial
system of evidence upon administrative tribunals could not be accomplished without imposing the lawyers also upon them, a result which is
believed by many to be very undesirable and inconsistent with the purposes and functions of administration'31
Like most federal statutes, the Railroad Retirement Act does not contain any express language on the problem here under consideration.132 Of
course, the necessity of accepting and relying upon various types of informal evidence is particularly apparent in the case of the "disbursing"
agencies of the federal government which constantly handle large numbers of small claims. Thus, the practice of the Railroad Retirement Board,
as one of the federal "disbursing" agencies, 31 to accept informal evidence
34
has been noted with approval by official reports and by legal scholars.
In this respect the "Administrative Procedure Bill,"'X3 proposed by the

American Bar Association, appears to be deficient. Section 6 (c) of the
bill provides, concerning the "hearings" before the administrative agency
contemplated by the bill, that: "The principles of materiality, probative
force, and substantiality as recognized in judicial proceedings of an equitable nature shall govern the proof, decision, and administrative or judicial
review of all questions of fact." While there seems to be a tendency to relax the common law rules of evidence in procedures of an equitable nature,
clearly no definite system has as yet emerged of rules of evidence as applicable to equitable actions. True, certain qualifications of the common
law rules of evidence have been noted in equity cases, 36 and on the basis of
See Wigmore, op. cit. p. 36.
The proposed "Railroad Social Insurance Act" (see supra, note 29) contains a specific
provision (§ 406 (e)) that "Common law and statutory rules of evidence, including but not
limited to rules excluding declarations of deceased persons and privileged communications,
shall not be controlling."
133 Other "disbursing" agencies of the federal government are the Veterans' Administration,
the Social Security Board, and the Employees' Compensation Commission.
131
132

134 See Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure pp.
35-42, 70, 7V, 398,399 (i94i); Davis, op. cit., supra, passim; Gellhorn, Federal Administrative
Proceedings 79 (94i).
13S

Supra, note ii.

r36

See, e.g., Wigmore, op. cit., supra, vol. i, pp. 14 ff.
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a "summary of evidence principles for a non-jury tribunal" as formulated
by Wigmore, application of such qualified system to administrative agencies has been advocated. 37 However, the contents of any such system, if at
all perceptible in the present state of legal development, seem to*be extremely vague, so that enactment of the "Administrative Procedure Bill"
apparently would fail to establish any unequivocal rule concerning evidence before administrative agencies. And while it is true that section
6 (c) of the bill specifically authorizes all agencies to "adopt procedures
for the disposition of contested matters in whole or in part upon the submission of sworn statements or Written evidence subject to opportunity
for .... cross-exaniination or rebuttal," it would not appear desirable to
apply any court rules on "materiality, probative force, and substantiality"
(and therefore, possibly, of at least certain aspects of the hearsay rule 31)
to the activities of the federal disbursing agencies. In fact, a modification
of the provisions of section 5 (e) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Act and of section 205 (b) of the Social Security Act would result from an
enactment of the proposed bill.
In the absence of specific language in the statute the courts have sanctioned the acceptance by the Railroad Retirement .Board of informal
evidence, without requiring observance of any court rules of evidence.
While the problem was passed upon sub silentio in numerous of the abovementioned court decisions, in which board orders were upheld under the
substantial evidence rule-for those orders had been based upon informal
evidence-express discussions of the problem are contained in two court
decisions,' Ellers v. Railroad Retirement Board"39 and Taylor v. Latimer,
Railroad Retirement Board. 40 In the latter case the plaintiff had complained that the "evidence before the board did not come up to the usual
standards of a proper procedural inquiry," because in determining whether the plaintiff was "totally and permanently disabled for regular employment for hire" within the meaning of the Railroad Retirement Act, the
board had relied upon reports of a medical examination, by the Veterans
Facility at Excelsior Springs, Missouri. The'court rejected that contention, stating that "it needs no citation of authorities to suggest that the
137 Vanderbilt,

.The Technique of Proof before Administrative Bodies,

24

Ia. L. Rev. 464

('939).
138 For a specific suggestion that administrative agencies disregard all exclusionary rules of
evidence, see, e.g., Swancara, Exclusionary Rules of Evidence in Administrative Hearings
(1939) I Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 77 (1939).

636 (1943).
x4o42 F. Slipp. 236 (1942).
'39 132 F. 2d
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law contemplates informality in the proceedings before administrative
boards. The courts hold such boards only to the duty of receiving dependable and reliable evidence; that means, such as reasonable persons
4
would rely upon as expressive of the truth.'' r
The decision in the .Ellers case is of general significance in the field of
administrative law because of the reason which the court advanced for its
conclusion that the board is not restricted by the rules of evidence applicable in court proceedings. Reversing the lower court 42 which had held
that the evidence relied upon by the board in support of its decision was
insubstantial because it consisted of reports, answers to questionnaires,
and letters, none of which was under oath, whereas Ellers' evidence consisted of affidavits, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the district court was in error in drawing a distinction between
sworn and unsworn evidence and in ascribing controlling weight to the
former. Judge Swan, delivering the- opinion of the circuit court, stated:
Administrative agencies are usually not restricted to the same rules of evidence as
apply in court proceedings, even in the absence of an express statutory provision on
the subject. [citing authorities.] While the Board is given power to compel the attendance of witnesses, administer oaths and take testimony, 45 U.S.C.A. § 228j (b) 4,

its administration of the Acts is not confined to information obtained by testimony.
The same section authorizes it to "make all necessary investigations in any matter involving annuities or other payments"; and to "require all employers and employees
.... to furnish such information and records as shall be necessary for the administration" of the Acts. If an employer wilfully refuses to make a report or knowingly reports
false information he is subjected to severe criminal penalties by § 13 of the Act, 45

U.S.C.A. § 228m. It is clear, therefore, that in adjudicating claims for annuities the
Board is permitted to consider evidence which would be objectionable in a court of
law, and if it is of a kind on which fair-minded men are accustomed to rely in serious
matters, it can support an administrative finding. See National Labor Relations Board
v. Remington Rand, 2 Cir., 94 F. 2d. 862, 873. The evidence received was of this character. The weight to be accorded it was for the Board to determine ..... 143
By thus sanctioning not only the receipt of written statements generally, without regard to whether they would, as such, be admissible in a court
under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, if properly introduced in
accordance with the law of evidence, but also by sanctioning specifically
the receipt of such written statements whether or not sworn to, the court
effectively freed the board of shackles, destructive of the purposes of the
legislation, which would have been created if it had been required that the
technical rules of evidence be observed by the board. It is interesting that
'4'

At 238.

42 44

F. Supp.

822 (1942).

143 132

F. 2d at 639.
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the court apparently was not satisfied with enunciating general principles,
as is frequently done by courts in similar opinions, but that it based its
conclusion on specific statutory language. Permission to consider evidence
which would be objectionable in a court of law was seen by the court in the
statutory provision (section io (b) 4 of the act) by which the board is
given power to "make all necessary investigations in any matter involving
annuities or other payments" and to "require all employers and employees .... to furnish such information and records as shall be necessary for
the administration" of the acts. And the criminal sanctions provided in
section 13 of the act for wilful refusals to make reports or knowingly reporting false information were considered by the court to be a clear indication that the receipt of unsworn evidence was contemplated by the
act. This manner of reasoning by the court is novel to some extent in that,
in an eminently proper way, it relates the problem of evidence before the
administrative agency to the latter's general investigatory powers, such
approach demonstrating a clear perception of the nature of the administrative process. The decision in the Ellers case thus acquires distinction as
an important pronouncement in the general development of administrative law, beyond its immediate function of construing a specific statutory enactment.
CONCLUSION

Certain conclusions are suggested by the above discussion. While, as
stated, the controlling importance of the specific statutory material has
been characteristic of the development of American administrative law,
certain general principles nevertheless seem to be in the process of crystallization. Our discussion of court decisions under the Railroad Retirement
Act concerning the issues of judicial review and of evidence has shown that
even in the absence of specific language in the statute certain elementary
rules are likely to be adopted by the courts. Both principles here involved,
the principle limiting the scope of judicial review and the principle as to
the inapplicability of the rules of evidence, are basic rules which deeply
affect the very foundation of administrative law itself. As generally recognized, it is the function of administrative law to determine the proper coordination between administrative matters and traditional principles of
law, by regulating the scope and the appropriate limits of administration
and by prescribing the proper relationship between rules of law and the
modern scheme of administration. The extent to which courts may exercise reviewing functions over the administration, and also the question
concerning the relationship between the common law rules of evidence
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and the procedure before administrative agencies, thus are matters which
go to the very heart of administrative law. The treatment given to those
matters by the courts in the interpretation of the Railroad Retirement
Act, without the assistance of express statutory language, demonstrates
that the present-day approach of the courts to some of the basic issues of
administrative law constitutes an expression of policy which is sound in
that it grants proper status to the administrative determinations and in
that it does not cripple the exercise of administrative functions by an attempt to force those functions into traditional common law concepts. If
consistently developed in accord with such an approach, administrative
law promises to become a means of effectuating, rather than a hindrance
to, efficient administration.

